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WILLIAMS v. REYNOLDS AND ANOTHER.
On the 1st of April the defendants contracted to sell to the plaintiff a quantity
of cotton at a certain price, to be delivered during the following August. In contracts for "forward delivery," it is the universal custom of the trade for the
purchaser to resell the goods before the time for delivery. Between the date of the
contract and the time of delivery, the plaintiff contracted with third persons for
the sale to them of cotton, to be delivered in August, relying upon the performance
by the defendants of their contract to enable him to fulfil his sub-contract. At the
date of the resale, the price of cotton bad risen considerably, but had fallen again
before the last day of August, when, however, it was still in excess of the price
for which the plaintiff had purchased in April. The defendants not having delivered
the cotton-Hedd, that the plaintiff was entitled, by way of damages, only to the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of delivery,
and was not entitled to recover the profits he would have realized by the performance of the sub-contract.

THE declaration stated that it was agreed between the plaintiff
and defendants, that the defendants should sell and deliver to the
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff should buy of the defendant, about
500 piculs of Chini cotton, at the price of Is.41d. per pound, to
be delivered in the month of August 1864, guaranteed fair; that
the defendants delivered, and the plaintiff accepted, 181 piculs,
but although all conditions had been performed, &c., and the
plaintiff was ready and willing to receive, yet the defendants did
not, in the said month of August, or at any other time, deliver to
the plaintiff the residue of the cotton, whereby the plaintiff was
incapacitated from performing a sub-contract for the sale of the
cotton at a higher price than Is. 41d., and the plaintiff lost the
profit he would have received from the performance of the said
contract.
Pleas-first, in denial of the agreement; secondly, that the
plaintiff was not ready and willing to accept the residue as alleged ;.
thirdly, that the defendants did deliver the residue in August;
and, fourthly, that the defendants were prevented, by the act of
the plaintiff, from delivering the said cotton. Issue thereon.
At the trial, which took place before SHEn, J., at the Liverpool
Spring Assizes, 1865, it appeared that on the 1st April 1864 the
plaintiff and defendants, who were cotton-brokers at Liverpool,
entered into a contract for the sale by the latter to the former of
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"about 500 piculs of cotton at Is. 4jd. per pound, to be delivered
during the following August." On the 25th May the plaintiff
contracted to sell to Messrs. Mayall & Anderson the same quantity
and quality of cotton, to be delivered in the month of August, at
Is. 71d. per pound. The defendants delivered to the plaintiff
during the month of August, 181 piculs of cotton only, in consequence of which the plaintiff was unable to fulfil the contract with
Messrs. Mayall & Anderson, beyond the delivery to them of those
181 piculs. On the 1st September the price of cotton, such as
that contracted for, had fallen again, and at that date was worth
Is. 61d. only. It was admitted that it was the universal custom
of Liverpool, for purchasers for "forward delivery" to resell, as
was here done. Reckoning a picul at 129 lbs., the difference
between the 500 piculs contracted for and the 181 piculs actually
delivered was 41,276 lbs.; a-Ad the plaintiff claimed as damages
5151. 19s., being the difference between the amount at which he
had bought the cotton from the defendants and that for which he
had sold it on the 25th May. The defendants contended that the
true measure was the difference only between the contract price
and the market price of the cotton on the last day of delivery,
i. e., the 31st August, which would be only 2571. 19s. 6d. A
verdict was taken for the plaintiff for 5151. 19s., with leave to the
defendants to move to reduce the verdict to 2571. 19s. 6d., if the
court should be of opinion that the measure of damages was only
the difference between the contract price and the market price on
the last day of delivery where the contract was broken.
A rule was accordingly obtained; against which,
B. G. Williams showed cause, and contended that, inasmuch
as by the universal custom of the cotton trade at Liverpool, these
contracts passed from hand to hand, a resale must be considered
as a natural consequence of the original purchase, and must be
taken to have been in the contemplation of the parties; and the
defendants were, therefore, liable in damages to the larger amount.
[He cited Berries v. iTutchinson, 18 0. B. N. S. 445; Wilson
v. The Lancashireand Yorkshire Bailway Company, 9 Id. 632;
Gee v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Bailway Company, 6 H.
& Norm. 211; Bandall v. Baper, 2 Bl. & El. 84; Smeed v.
Ford, 1 El. & El. 602; and Dunloy v. Higgins, 1 H. L. 0. 881.]
Quain, in support of the rule, was not heard.
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CROMPTON, J.-I am of opinion that the rule should be made
absolute to reduce the damages to 2571. 19s. 6d. The extra
damages claimed by the plaintiff are not recoverable, either on
principle or authority. The contract is to deliver cotton within a
certain time; but between the date of the contract and the limit
for the time fixed for delivery the price rises, so that the buyer is
in a position to make an advantageous resale; and he, in fact,
makes a contract with a third person for the sale of the cotton at
an enhanced price. The price afterwards falls again; and at the
time of the breaking of the contract by the non-delivery, the real
or market price is higher than the contract price, but lower than
that at which the plaintiff agreed to sell. These being the facts,
the question is, what is the measure of damages ? Generally
speaking, the difference between the contract price and the real
or market price at the time of the breach; but here the plaintiff
contends that the criterion of the market price does not apply,
and claims the difference between the two contract prices. I am
of opinion that this is not the measure of damages to which he is
entitled. He claims it as special damage, and, in effect, says,
"1Imade a contract at a higher price, the benefit of which I have
lost by your default, and therefore I have a right to pin you to
that price." But this is not within the rule which measures
damages by the consequences naturally resulting from the breach,
or being within the contemplation of the parties. I entirely agree
with what is said in Mayne on Damages (p. 15), where the author,
citing -fadley/v. Baxendale, says, "The first, and in fact the
only inquiry is, whether the damage complained of is the natural
and reasonable result of the defendant's act; it will assume that
character if it can be shown to be such a consequence as in the
ordinary state of things would flow from the act, or, in cases of
contract, if it appears to have been contemplated by both parties."
The extra damage here sought to be recovered does not come
within either branch of the rule; and all the authorities are in
opposition to the claim. .Dunlop v. Higgins was a case under
the Scotch law, and all that Lord COTTENHAM says amounts to
nothing more than it was not a case in which the court ought to
reduce the damages to the English rule. In Berries v. Hutchinso the Court of Common Pleas must be taken to have considered the sub-contract as contemporaneous, and known to the
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defendant at the time of his contract. In Mayne on Damages
(p. 18), the author, after remarking that Dunlop v. .iggins is
not law in England, proceeds to observe, "It is, however, remarkable for -avigorous onslaught upon the English law by so
formidable an opponent as Lord COTTENHAM ;" and further on,
"The question is not what profit the plaintiff might have made,
but what profit he professed to be purchasing. Not what damage
he actually suffered, but what the other contemplated and undertook to pay for. It is quite clear that loss of profits by a resale
can never be contemplated, unless the resale has taken place at
the time, and is communicated to the other party. The reason is,
that such a profit is utterly incapable of valuation. It may depend
upon a change of weather, a scientific discovery, an outbreak of
war, a workman's strike. It will depend upon the energy and
sagacity of the person who purchases the goods, and the solvency
of the person to whom he sells them again. In short, if the Scotch
rule were to be carried out to its fair extent, no one could contract to sell goods which were not actually in his possession,
without charging an additional premium commensurate to the
profits which the vendee might possibly make, and for which he
himself would have to pay if prevented from carrying out his
agreement." It is obviously impossible that when a contract is
made at a particular period when the price is floating, for delivery
at a future time, the seller should contemplate as part of his liability in case of default, some other contract to be made before
that time elapses. This is exactly like the case of stock purchased
for the account, and in such case no one ever thought that anything but the market price at the time of delivery was contemplated; the reason being, that any other loss to the buyer would
not be the natural consequence of the breach of contract (which
is, perhaps, a better phrase than "too remote"), and would not be
in the contemplation of the parties. The seller contracts upon a
speculation of what the price may be at the time of delivery, and
not with reference to five or six bargains which the buyer may
make in the mean time, about which he knows nothing; and this
is very different from the case where parties contract for the
supply of material to carry out an actual contract already made
and known to both of them. The claim is against reason and
authority, and we must hold that the plaintiff has no right to
recover more than the difference between the contract price and
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the market price on the day when the delivery of the goods pur.
chased should have taken place.
BLACKBURN, J.-I
am of the same opinion. The facts appear
to be, that on the 1st April 1864 the plaintiff and the defendants
-entered into a contract, by *Vhich the defendants agreed to sell
500 piculs of cotton at is. 41d. per pound; delivery to be made
in August. They had, therefore, all the month of August to
supply a certain quantity of cotton answering the description
given, at a certain price. At the end of August the cotton still
remained undelivered; and if the matter had stood there the
damages would be the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the end of August, the latest time for delivery,
which was Is. 61d. The question is, whether the plaintiff is, upon
the facts, entitled to further damages. The contract was made at
Liverpool, where, it is said, the custom is to buy on speculation;
and it was admitted that, in the ordinary course of business, such
contracts are to a certain extent the subject of resale; that is to
say, the buyer does not resell or transfer the contract like a bill
of lading, but contracts with some other person to sell a similar
quantity of goods, of a like description to those which he has purchased, looking to his own vendor for the means of carrying out
the sub-contract. Cases, no doubt, may exist where, if one party
make a contract binding himself to deliver goods, he makes the
contract to deliver to others whom the purchaser may name, who
rely on the original seller's liability; but that is not the present
case. The additional facts here were, that on the 25th May, a
time about halfway between the date of the original contract and
the time for delivery, the plaintiff made a sub-contract with Messrs.
Mayall & Anderson for the sale to them of cotton at is. 7,d., of
the same quality and quantity, and to be delivered at the same
time, as that he had himself contracted to purchase of the defendants. Therefore, if in August the defendants had fulfilled their
contract, the plaintiff would have been enabled to supply his
vendors, and would have reaped a considerable profit by the
transaction. The argument is, that in the Liverpool market it
was a natural consequence that a person having made such a contract as the original one in the present case would, upon the
strength of it, enter into a similar sub-contract; and, further, that
it would be in the contemplation of the parties that the breaking
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of the first contract would render the fulfilment of the second
impossible. No authority was cited for this position; and, in my
opinion, it would not be the necessary or natural consequence of
the defendants' breach of contract. It does not necessarily follow
that the purchaser would look to the delivery of the cotton as the
means of enabling him to fulfil his second contract; and if, as the
case may oftentimes be, he had reason to suspect the solvency of
his vendor, it would be highly imprudent in him to do so. Here,
however, the plaintiff did rely on the due delivery by the defendants of the goods purchased, but he is not, therefore, entitled to
throw the blame on them, and say that they are liable for all consequent loss. Many analogous cases may be put in support of
this view. For instance, announcements are of constant occurrence in the advertising columns of the "1Times" newspaper, that
"owing to failure of remittances from abroad Messrs. A. & B. are
Could it be for a moment
compelled to suspend payment."
argued that a firm thus compelled to suspend "orrelinquish business could recover from those by whose default they suffered all
the loss consequent upon their suspension of payment ? All that
could be recovered in such case would be the amount actually
due, with interest; and the loss of credit and other inconveniences
consequent upon the failure of the remittances could not for a
moment be treated as forming the ground .of special damage. So
in the case of bills of lading, by which goods are made deliverable
to the consignee or assigns for the express purpose of making
them transferrable on delivery, so that they may be used for the
purpose of fresh contracts, if the shipowner fails to deliver, it has
never been suggested to include in the damages to be recovered
the increased value at which the goods had been sold during the
interval of carriage. In like manner, in the case of the sale of
shares on the Stock Exchange, the contract is made for the
express purpose of enabling the purchasers to pass the contract
from hand to hand; yet it has never been contemplated that the
original seller would be liable for the highest price obtained
betweeft the day of contract and the day of account; and yet, if
the plaintiff's argument be sound, it would follow that he would
be so liable. There is no case precisely in point, but my Brother
CROMPTOx has cited from Mayne on Damages what appear to me
very cogent reasons why we should not adopt the plaintiff's view;
and I am, therefore, of opinion that the rule should be made
absolute to reduce the damages to the smaller sum.

